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Should we be made to carry ID cards?
- Thread starter brighton rock
- Start date
CAFC Matt
New member
The people who don't want one are hiding something, I have no problem with them
I'm not hiding anything and I don't want one.
Why?
We have enough ID to prove who we are
We have enough ID to regulate who can and who can not work
It's a waste of tax payers money - I'd sooner see the cash spent on improving social conditions
If Blunkett doesn't know how many illegal immigrants are here now, then he should be sacked - id cards won't make any difference
Why?
We have enough ID to prove who we are
We have enough ID to regulate who can and who can not work
It's a waste of tax payers money - I'd sooner see the cash spent on improving social conditions
If Blunkett doesn't know how many illegal immigrants are here now, then he should be sacked - id cards won't make any difference
Hamilton - The problem is not everybody drives, not everybody actually has a passport. Surely the point of this is that it is a universal form of id that will help the public services better and will undoubtedly assist the police, ambulance services etc and make their work a lot easier than it is now.
Its not all about having things to hide and immigrants.
Its not all about having things to hide and immigrants.
Tokyo Seagull said:
I was going to say exactly that but you beat me to it. I don't feel my carrying of an ID card in any way threatens my rights.
Mind you BR is that the same Oliver Letwin who recently tried to drum up Asian support for the Tories by appearing in a turban? Clown
Dandyman
In London village.
This may be of interest:
Identity Cards and the Slow Death of Parliamentary Government
Caroline Ellis
Violations of Rights in Britain Series 3 No.29
In October 1986 a Bill was put before the Australian Federal House of Representatives to introduce a national identity card scheme. The scheme, known as 'The Australia Card', was strongly promoted by the Hawke government as the only way to catch tax and social security cheats. The Card would contain a photograph, name, unique number, signature and period of validity and was to be carried by all Australian citizens and permanent residents, with separately marked cards issued to temporary residents and visitors.
Initially the public appeared to accept the idea. But as debate on the issue got underway rumblings of discontent began to be felt about the principle of a national identification system itself, its implications for the privacy and freedom of the individual and whether it was an appropriate response to the social problems it aimed to redress. It became clear that the scheme would involve surveillance of individuals on a massive scale. Government agencies were falling over themselves to get in on the act - they wanted to use the Card for financial transactions, employment, health benefits, passport control, housing. Civil libertarians and other opponents argued that at stake was nothing less than the nature of Australian society; the Australia Card would mean a savage attack on the liberties of private people that could set the country on the slope to a police state.
In September 1987, as a result of government splits and massive public protests, the Bill was scrapped. Having rejected the Australia Card, a Federal Tax Number was introduced, as an alternative, along with strong privacy legislation.
The Australian experience is instructive for us as we contemplate the possibility of a national identity card scheme in the UK. Australia shares with the UK a system of government based on the Westminster model. It is a parliamentary democracy with largely unwritten rights and only a skeletal constitution - albeit one rather better than our own .
Australians were given the opportunity to decide, openly and democratically through the parliamentary process, what was regarded as a fundamental issue about the nature of their society.
They took the view that a national identification system, with all its implications for the relationship between government and governed, was not acceptable for their society.
After a lengthy and controversial legislative process and against considerable public opposition a new machine-readable identity card was introduced in West Germany on 1 April 1987 (German citizens have had identity cards in some form for over 56 years). Objections to the new-style German ID card also focused on the risk to individual privacy and the dangers of a surveillance state. What is instructive about the German experience is that constitutional checks and balances were in place to mitigate these dangers. For instance, in 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled that each individual had a constitutional right to 'information self-determination.' This ruling enabled the Data Protection Commissioners to argue that it would be incompatible with this basic human right to set up a unique identity number system which would allow the linking of all existing government databases. The German ID Card Act of 1987 was therefore obliged to contain detailed provisions to this effect.1
Here in Britain, ideas emanating from the inner reaches of government are not necessarily subject to either of these disciplines - of parliamentary scrutiny or of constitutional checks and balances.
Ministers may dream up barmy schemes in their bathtubs or even possibly brilliant ones. That is their prerogative. Problems arise when today’s scheme is bounced into reality without so much as a by-your-leave. Even good ideas can turn into the worst nightmares without effective scrutiny and proper safeguards.
One such idea, which seems to bubble up regularly from various bathtubs, is the introduction of identity cards. Until very recently successive governments had dismissed all talk of a national identity card scheme. A large batch of motions calling for a compulsory identity card system from local Conservative Associations to the 1994 Party Conference and the need for a ‘new agenda’ to revive Conservative fortunes put paid to that. A Green Paper and an open and informed debate were promised. Yet identity cards are not a straightforward party political issue. It seems that both the main parties are divided - and as we’ll see later there is important Conservative opposition. What is also clear is that there is an influential lobby for the introduction of ID cards and that it is proceeding to get its way by by-passing Parliament.
The Green Paper was a cautious affair offering a range of options from a voluntary identity card/travel card to a multi-function Government card or a compulsory identity card scheme - and indeed the option of 'making no changes to current plans with no identity card introduced'.2 "The time has come to re-examine the need for identity cards," it was suggested, "because of advancements in information technology and three recent policy developments."
In May 1994 the Secretary of State for Social Security announced plans to automate the system for paying social security benefits at Post Offices. Orderbooks and giro-cheques will be phased out and replaced by machine readable benefit payment cards which will be the 'key' to accessing at the Post Office counter details of benefit payments due from a database which will hold this information. These will be introduced some time next year.
In August 1994 the Secretary of State for Transport announced plans to introduce plastic driving licences with photographs from July 1996 to comply with an EC directive.
In December 1994 the Home Secretary announced that he was withdrawing the British Visitors Passport, used for short visits to 25 countries mainly in Europe.
But these are not the only developments germane to this debate. In January this year a report by the Government Centre for Information Systems (CCTA) had turned up in an old filing cabinet in a junk shop in Camden. It revealed that there are no less than 22 separate inquiries into the introduction of 'smart cards' going on in Whitehall. The CCTA report suggested a model smart card based on the new photographic driving licence - which could then be validated for secondary uses such as a savings card, medical record card, passport or social security card, by the appropriate authorities - could be made available very soon. It would carry a magnetic strip, signature and fingerprint data. The report had been discussed by the Cabinet where this scheme has found favour.
In July the Home Secretary waved a wand and introduced what is in effect a 'snoopers’ charter' under which social workers, teachers, doctors and others are to be encouraged to report people they suspect of being illegal immigrants to the Home Office. So while the Green Paper was apparently ensuring a degree of public consultation over implications, in fact the Government was proceeding towards the policy of a multipurpose 'smart card' as well as stepping up state surveillance of 'suspect' individuals in the community. Latterly the Home Secretary announced that he wishes to enlist the services of milkmen and postmen to keep an eye out for strange goings-on in their neighbourhoods. Few have asked where their information is supposed to be logged...
Why a national identity card?
In her initial commentary on the Green Paper, the Data Protection Registrar commented that: "The Green Paper does not prescribe a purpose, it proposes a variety of options from which purpose may be deduced."3 The main emphasis is on identity cards as the latest consumer item designed to maximise personal choice and convenience. Some unsubstantiated paragraphs on crime control are thrown in. As a marketing strategy this has something to be said for it. Yet there is one potential beneficiary of an ID scheme which is conspicuous by its absence: the centralised state and its ability to control the population.
This is quite deliberate. As the Cabinet document summarising the CCTA report put it, public concern about 'the spectre of a police state' will need to be allayed by making the cards 'an attractive practical proposition'.4 An IPPR/Justice Consultation paper points out: "This approach is strongly reminiscent of that adopted in 1939, when the Registrar-General advised the Government that ‘a close association between national registration and food rationing would benefit both. The former would gain politically from an association with food rather than conscription’."5
Put together the various pieces of this particular jigsaw and what emerges is an attempt to create an all-seeing, all-knowing surveillance state. A system of national identification will be essential to its success.
Surveillance is only the first part of the game. It is estimated that the average adult has private information about her or himself on over 200 separate files. By 1982 Government departments boasted 220 different data banks. Now technology provides the opportunity for Government to draw all this disparate information together. One way is through the practice of data matching - linking up computer files on individuals across departments to build profiles of the ‘data subject’. This has been greatly advanced by the creation of the Government Data Network set up to facilitate data exchanges between departments such as the DSS, Home Office, Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise. Another way is to centralise information on a single national database, for which there will soon by a prototype in the form of the new, privately controlled National Insurance 2 Recording System.
Or take the Police National Computer which holds 60 million records containing information gathered from stop and search exercises, security checks and reports of police officers and informers. As long ago as 1978 the Lindhop Committee on Data Protection described this information as 'hearsay, speculative, suppositional and unverifiable'. It is estimated that 70,000 individuals are under surveillance thanks to the Stolen and Suspect Vehicles Index and the Wanted and Missing Persons Index of the Police National Computer being 'of long term interest to the police' yet few of them are missing or suspected of any offence.6
Information, they say, is power and the more information a government has on each of its citizens, the more powerful it becomes. If used judiciously and tempered by clear limits and safeguards against abuse then the potential for unwarranted surveillance is diminished. But the safeguards are not many.
There is no right to privacy recognised in UK law. We cannot stop the authorities finding out things about us we wish, quite legally, to keep to ourselves.
Nor is there a general 'right to know' about the things that are done in our name. We cannot check, as a matter of right, that what they record is accurate and that improper records are eliminated.
Moreover the Data Protection Act is woefully inadequate to tackle infringements upon our privacy by public and private authorities. It is hedged with exemptions. No Government department may be prosecuted for a data protection offence. Damages may only be awarded for incorrect data compiled directly by the data user, not for information supplied by third parties. The Data Protection Registrar has warned that the Act 'would not provide effective protection against the disclosure of information and cross-matching of files which might follow the introduction of a widely usable national identification system.'
This brings us to the nub of the issue. For information is only power when it can be retrieved or uncovered. In some ways the authorities already have too much information on us. What they wish to do, and what an ID card would greatly assist them in doing, is to link all the information together.
What are the implications for people’s life chances of such practices? According to the Data Protection Registrar they are: "the wide use and disclosure of information without an individual’s knowledge or consent; for the use of information out of context to the detriment of individuals; for the wide replication of errors; for unjust decisions taken about individuals simply on the basis of a ‘profile’ which causes them to fall into a group with certain selected characteristics; for automatic decision-making on facts of doubtful completeness, accuracy or relevance; for the surveillance of individuals; and for influencing people’s lives."7
Will Parliament decide?
Without the necessary constitutional safeguards, the onus falls on Parliament. At present there is little hope of finding a Parliamentary majority for the introduction of identity cards. With eloquent support from the Sunday and Daily Telegraph many Conservative MPs have begun to rally against ID cards, worried that they would be an excuse for relaxing border controls and condemning them as a European imposition. And as the Conservative Way Forward’s Policy Paper, Identity Cards - Freedom Under Threat, put it: "The introduction of identity cards would raise fundamental questions about the position of the citizen and the State ... Identity cards could alter the balance of our constitution and bring into question the need for more fundamental constitutional reform."
The response of those seeking to introduce ID cards is to by-pass Parliamentary approval.
Take the new driving licence. This was not a matter determined by Parliament. This would not matter if it were simply a question of minor design alterations. But it clearly is not. Although civil liberty objections to the new format were pooh-poohed by the Government, the Green Paper gives the game away:
"Driving licences are already often used informally as evidence of identity. In those countries which already have photo-driving licences the photo-driving licence is often used for identification purposes in circumstances where an identity card might otherwise be used." The DVLA consultation document recognised that the addition of a photograph to the driving licence would increase its value for identification purposes .
Despite this, the Green Paper goes on to say "There would not appear to be any legislative implications for using a photo-driving licence as a de facto identity card ..." (Chapter 5, Paras 5.13 & 5.16)
With the identity card/travel card it’s the same story: "No significant legislation should be required to introduce a card for travel in Europe ... as it could be issued in the same way as a passport which is issued under the Royal Prerogative ..." (Chapter 5. Para 5.10)
And as for a multi-function Government 'smart' card: "Whatever the outcome of the consultation on an identity card scheme the Government may wish to take advantage of smart card technology as it develops for the administration of its services where cost benefit savings can be achieved, for example through the use of common infrastructures." (Chapter 6, Para 6.16)
In plain language, the authorities are saying that the new ID card-style driving licence, the new travel card and the new smart card can be implemented by decrees that do not have to be given the approval of Parliament.
Last year the then Data Protection Registrar in his annual report stated that: "... none of these four publicly created identification systems - the proposed driving licence with a photograph; the proposed social security ‘swipe card’; the National Insurance Number; and the National Health Service Number - is adequately protected against forming the basis of a de facto national identification system. Nor do there seem to be plans to provide such protection. A de facto system could therefore develop with no proper analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such a system, without effective debate in Parliament and without proper statutory controls."8
To introduce a system of national identification would be to alter, irrevocably, the relationship between the individual and the state. The individual’s ability to control what is communicated about them, to enjoy some degree of privacy in their daily lives, to be subject to the minimum of intrusion by the state and to be free from surveillance would be diminished, while the power of the state would increase.
As in Australia, what is at stake is the very nature of our society and the values that we cherish. We like to think we live in a free society in which a careful balance is preserved between individual freedom and the public interest, or common good. We like to think that Parliament can take the lead in protecting and extending our rights and freedoms against the encroachment of the executive. It is supposed to hold Government to account, to provide effective scrutiny of legislation, to expose administrative wrong-doing. Romantic notions, perhaps. But Parliament is at least supposed to get a look in.
Yet on this issue - an issue of fundamental importance for the future of our society and the nature of our constitution - Parliament may never have a say. Churchill himself moved to abolish the war-time national registration scheme’s identity cards. He did so in order to 'free the people'. Now, this freedom is on the way to being abolished without a decisive Parliamentary debate. Even supporters of identity cards must agree that this is no way to conduct public policy if you wish to call your country a democracy.
Footnotes
1. For more details on the German experience see Identity Cards in Germany, Dr. Alexander Dix (Deputy Data Protection Commissioner, Berlin), Lecture given at the Conference "Identity Cards: Putting you in the Picture" hosted by the Data Protection Registrar, London, 21st June 1995.
2. Identity Cards - A Consultation Document, May 1995 HMSO
3. Identity Cards: Putting you in the picture, Data Protection Registrar (June 1995)
4. Memorandum, Wakeham to Prime Minister, 25 May 1994.
5. Identity Cards Revisited, IPPR & Justice, May 1995.
6. I-D cards: A solution looking for a problem, Liberty June 1995.
7. Fifth Report of the Data Protection Registrar (HMSO 1989)
8 Tenth Report of the Data Protection Registrar (HMSO 1994)
Caroline Ellis was Charter 88's Parliamentary and Political Officer from 1993 to 1996. Together with Susie Rabin and Chloe Alexander, she researched and wrote Charter 88's Response to the Green Paper on Identity Cards. The same team produced the present paper.
Identity Cards and the Slow Death of Parliamentary Government
Caroline Ellis
Violations of Rights in Britain Series 3 No.29
In October 1986 a Bill was put before the Australian Federal House of Representatives to introduce a national identity card scheme. The scheme, known as 'The Australia Card', was strongly promoted by the Hawke government as the only way to catch tax and social security cheats. The Card would contain a photograph, name, unique number, signature and period of validity and was to be carried by all Australian citizens and permanent residents, with separately marked cards issued to temporary residents and visitors.
Initially the public appeared to accept the idea. But as debate on the issue got underway rumblings of discontent began to be felt about the principle of a national identification system itself, its implications for the privacy and freedom of the individual and whether it was an appropriate response to the social problems it aimed to redress. It became clear that the scheme would involve surveillance of individuals on a massive scale. Government agencies were falling over themselves to get in on the act - they wanted to use the Card for financial transactions, employment, health benefits, passport control, housing. Civil libertarians and other opponents argued that at stake was nothing less than the nature of Australian society; the Australia Card would mean a savage attack on the liberties of private people that could set the country on the slope to a police state.
In September 1987, as a result of government splits and massive public protests, the Bill was scrapped. Having rejected the Australia Card, a Federal Tax Number was introduced, as an alternative, along with strong privacy legislation.
The Australian experience is instructive for us as we contemplate the possibility of a national identity card scheme in the UK. Australia shares with the UK a system of government based on the Westminster model. It is a parliamentary democracy with largely unwritten rights and only a skeletal constitution - albeit one rather better than our own .
Australians were given the opportunity to decide, openly and democratically through the parliamentary process, what was regarded as a fundamental issue about the nature of their society.
They took the view that a national identification system, with all its implications for the relationship between government and governed, was not acceptable for their society.
After a lengthy and controversial legislative process and against considerable public opposition a new machine-readable identity card was introduced in West Germany on 1 April 1987 (German citizens have had identity cards in some form for over 56 years). Objections to the new-style German ID card also focused on the risk to individual privacy and the dangers of a surveillance state. What is instructive about the German experience is that constitutional checks and balances were in place to mitigate these dangers. For instance, in 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court had ruled that each individual had a constitutional right to 'information self-determination.' This ruling enabled the Data Protection Commissioners to argue that it would be incompatible with this basic human right to set up a unique identity number system which would allow the linking of all existing government databases. The German ID Card Act of 1987 was therefore obliged to contain detailed provisions to this effect.1
Here in Britain, ideas emanating from the inner reaches of government are not necessarily subject to either of these disciplines - of parliamentary scrutiny or of constitutional checks and balances.
Ministers may dream up barmy schemes in their bathtubs or even possibly brilliant ones. That is their prerogative. Problems arise when today’s scheme is bounced into reality without so much as a by-your-leave. Even good ideas can turn into the worst nightmares without effective scrutiny and proper safeguards.
One such idea, which seems to bubble up regularly from various bathtubs, is the introduction of identity cards. Until very recently successive governments had dismissed all talk of a national identity card scheme. A large batch of motions calling for a compulsory identity card system from local Conservative Associations to the 1994 Party Conference and the need for a ‘new agenda’ to revive Conservative fortunes put paid to that. A Green Paper and an open and informed debate were promised. Yet identity cards are not a straightforward party political issue. It seems that both the main parties are divided - and as we’ll see later there is important Conservative opposition. What is also clear is that there is an influential lobby for the introduction of ID cards and that it is proceeding to get its way by by-passing Parliament.
The Green Paper was a cautious affair offering a range of options from a voluntary identity card/travel card to a multi-function Government card or a compulsory identity card scheme - and indeed the option of 'making no changes to current plans with no identity card introduced'.2 "The time has come to re-examine the need for identity cards," it was suggested, "because of advancements in information technology and three recent policy developments."
In May 1994 the Secretary of State for Social Security announced plans to automate the system for paying social security benefits at Post Offices. Orderbooks and giro-cheques will be phased out and replaced by machine readable benefit payment cards which will be the 'key' to accessing at the Post Office counter details of benefit payments due from a database which will hold this information. These will be introduced some time next year.
In August 1994 the Secretary of State for Transport announced plans to introduce plastic driving licences with photographs from July 1996 to comply with an EC directive.
In December 1994 the Home Secretary announced that he was withdrawing the British Visitors Passport, used for short visits to 25 countries mainly in Europe.
But these are not the only developments germane to this debate. In January this year a report by the Government Centre for Information Systems (CCTA) had turned up in an old filing cabinet in a junk shop in Camden. It revealed that there are no less than 22 separate inquiries into the introduction of 'smart cards' going on in Whitehall. The CCTA report suggested a model smart card based on the new photographic driving licence - which could then be validated for secondary uses such as a savings card, medical record card, passport or social security card, by the appropriate authorities - could be made available very soon. It would carry a magnetic strip, signature and fingerprint data. The report had been discussed by the Cabinet where this scheme has found favour.
In July the Home Secretary waved a wand and introduced what is in effect a 'snoopers’ charter' under which social workers, teachers, doctors and others are to be encouraged to report people they suspect of being illegal immigrants to the Home Office. So while the Green Paper was apparently ensuring a degree of public consultation over implications, in fact the Government was proceeding towards the policy of a multipurpose 'smart card' as well as stepping up state surveillance of 'suspect' individuals in the community. Latterly the Home Secretary announced that he wishes to enlist the services of milkmen and postmen to keep an eye out for strange goings-on in their neighbourhoods. Few have asked where their information is supposed to be logged...
Why a national identity card?
In her initial commentary on the Green Paper, the Data Protection Registrar commented that: "The Green Paper does not prescribe a purpose, it proposes a variety of options from which purpose may be deduced."3 The main emphasis is on identity cards as the latest consumer item designed to maximise personal choice and convenience. Some unsubstantiated paragraphs on crime control are thrown in. As a marketing strategy this has something to be said for it. Yet there is one potential beneficiary of an ID scheme which is conspicuous by its absence: the centralised state and its ability to control the population.
This is quite deliberate. As the Cabinet document summarising the CCTA report put it, public concern about 'the spectre of a police state' will need to be allayed by making the cards 'an attractive practical proposition'.4 An IPPR/Justice Consultation paper points out: "This approach is strongly reminiscent of that adopted in 1939, when the Registrar-General advised the Government that ‘a close association between national registration and food rationing would benefit both. The former would gain politically from an association with food rather than conscription’."5
Put together the various pieces of this particular jigsaw and what emerges is an attempt to create an all-seeing, all-knowing surveillance state. A system of national identification will be essential to its success.
Surveillance is only the first part of the game. It is estimated that the average adult has private information about her or himself on over 200 separate files. By 1982 Government departments boasted 220 different data banks. Now technology provides the opportunity for Government to draw all this disparate information together. One way is through the practice of data matching - linking up computer files on individuals across departments to build profiles of the ‘data subject’. This has been greatly advanced by the creation of the Government Data Network set up to facilitate data exchanges between departments such as the DSS, Home Office, Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise. Another way is to centralise information on a single national database, for which there will soon by a prototype in the form of the new, privately controlled National Insurance 2 Recording System.
Or take the Police National Computer which holds 60 million records containing information gathered from stop and search exercises, security checks and reports of police officers and informers. As long ago as 1978 the Lindhop Committee on Data Protection described this information as 'hearsay, speculative, suppositional and unverifiable'. It is estimated that 70,000 individuals are under surveillance thanks to the Stolen and Suspect Vehicles Index and the Wanted and Missing Persons Index of the Police National Computer being 'of long term interest to the police' yet few of them are missing or suspected of any offence.6
Information, they say, is power and the more information a government has on each of its citizens, the more powerful it becomes. If used judiciously and tempered by clear limits and safeguards against abuse then the potential for unwarranted surveillance is diminished. But the safeguards are not many.
There is no right to privacy recognised in UK law. We cannot stop the authorities finding out things about us we wish, quite legally, to keep to ourselves.
Nor is there a general 'right to know' about the things that are done in our name. We cannot check, as a matter of right, that what they record is accurate and that improper records are eliminated.
Moreover the Data Protection Act is woefully inadequate to tackle infringements upon our privacy by public and private authorities. It is hedged with exemptions. No Government department may be prosecuted for a data protection offence. Damages may only be awarded for incorrect data compiled directly by the data user, not for information supplied by third parties. The Data Protection Registrar has warned that the Act 'would not provide effective protection against the disclosure of information and cross-matching of files which might follow the introduction of a widely usable national identification system.'
This brings us to the nub of the issue. For information is only power when it can be retrieved or uncovered. In some ways the authorities already have too much information on us. What they wish to do, and what an ID card would greatly assist them in doing, is to link all the information together.
What are the implications for people’s life chances of such practices? According to the Data Protection Registrar they are: "the wide use and disclosure of information without an individual’s knowledge or consent; for the use of information out of context to the detriment of individuals; for the wide replication of errors; for unjust decisions taken about individuals simply on the basis of a ‘profile’ which causes them to fall into a group with certain selected characteristics; for automatic decision-making on facts of doubtful completeness, accuracy or relevance; for the surveillance of individuals; and for influencing people’s lives."7
Will Parliament decide?
Without the necessary constitutional safeguards, the onus falls on Parliament. At present there is little hope of finding a Parliamentary majority for the introduction of identity cards. With eloquent support from the Sunday and Daily Telegraph many Conservative MPs have begun to rally against ID cards, worried that they would be an excuse for relaxing border controls and condemning them as a European imposition. And as the Conservative Way Forward’s Policy Paper, Identity Cards - Freedom Under Threat, put it: "The introduction of identity cards would raise fundamental questions about the position of the citizen and the State ... Identity cards could alter the balance of our constitution and bring into question the need for more fundamental constitutional reform."
The response of those seeking to introduce ID cards is to by-pass Parliamentary approval.
Take the new driving licence. This was not a matter determined by Parliament. This would not matter if it were simply a question of minor design alterations. But it clearly is not. Although civil liberty objections to the new format were pooh-poohed by the Government, the Green Paper gives the game away:
"Driving licences are already often used informally as evidence of identity. In those countries which already have photo-driving licences the photo-driving licence is often used for identification purposes in circumstances where an identity card might otherwise be used." The DVLA consultation document recognised that the addition of a photograph to the driving licence would increase its value for identification purposes .
Despite this, the Green Paper goes on to say "There would not appear to be any legislative implications for using a photo-driving licence as a de facto identity card ..." (Chapter 5, Paras 5.13 & 5.16)
With the identity card/travel card it’s the same story: "No significant legislation should be required to introduce a card for travel in Europe ... as it could be issued in the same way as a passport which is issued under the Royal Prerogative ..." (Chapter 5. Para 5.10)
And as for a multi-function Government 'smart' card: "Whatever the outcome of the consultation on an identity card scheme the Government may wish to take advantage of smart card technology as it develops for the administration of its services where cost benefit savings can be achieved, for example through the use of common infrastructures." (Chapter 6, Para 6.16)
In plain language, the authorities are saying that the new ID card-style driving licence, the new travel card and the new smart card can be implemented by decrees that do not have to be given the approval of Parliament.
Last year the then Data Protection Registrar in his annual report stated that: "... none of these four publicly created identification systems - the proposed driving licence with a photograph; the proposed social security ‘swipe card’; the National Insurance Number; and the National Health Service Number - is adequately protected against forming the basis of a de facto national identification system. Nor do there seem to be plans to provide such protection. A de facto system could therefore develop with no proper analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such a system, without effective debate in Parliament and without proper statutory controls."8
To introduce a system of national identification would be to alter, irrevocably, the relationship between the individual and the state. The individual’s ability to control what is communicated about them, to enjoy some degree of privacy in their daily lives, to be subject to the minimum of intrusion by the state and to be free from surveillance would be diminished, while the power of the state would increase.
As in Australia, what is at stake is the very nature of our society and the values that we cherish. We like to think we live in a free society in which a careful balance is preserved between individual freedom and the public interest, or common good. We like to think that Parliament can take the lead in protecting and extending our rights and freedoms against the encroachment of the executive. It is supposed to hold Government to account, to provide effective scrutiny of legislation, to expose administrative wrong-doing. Romantic notions, perhaps. But Parliament is at least supposed to get a look in.
Yet on this issue - an issue of fundamental importance for the future of our society and the nature of our constitution - Parliament may never have a say. Churchill himself moved to abolish the war-time national registration scheme’s identity cards. He did so in order to 'free the people'. Now, this freedom is on the way to being abolished without a decisive Parliamentary debate. Even supporters of identity cards must agree that this is no way to conduct public policy if you wish to call your country a democracy.
Footnotes
1. For more details on the German experience see Identity Cards in Germany, Dr. Alexander Dix (Deputy Data Protection Commissioner, Berlin), Lecture given at the Conference "Identity Cards: Putting you in the Picture" hosted by the Data Protection Registrar, London, 21st June 1995.
2. Identity Cards - A Consultation Document, May 1995 HMSO
3. Identity Cards: Putting you in the picture, Data Protection Registrar (June 1995)
4. Memorandum, Wakeham to Prime Minister, 25 May 1994.
5. Identity Cards Revisited, IPPR & Justice, May 1995.
6. I-D cards: A solution looking for a problem, Liberty June 1995.
7. Fifth Report of the Data Protection Registrar (HMSO 1989)
8 Tenth Report of the Data Protection Registrar (HMSO 1994)
Caroline Ellis was Charter 88's Parliamentary and Political Officer from 1993 to 1996. Together with Susie Rabin and Chloe Alexander, she researched and wrote Charter 88's Response to the Green Paper on Identity Cards. The same team produced the present paper.
Albion Rob
New member
I don't want them myself for the simple fact that I'm fine as I am.
Also what if you lost it or it fell into the wrong hands. Imagine someone stole your card, committed a crime and then your card got the blame as it were. Or if the information was put on the wrong card, these mistakes could happen. You could see yourself refused everything from credit to health care on the basis that some twat accidentally put a 5 instead of a 6 on a computer.
I also think it excludes people even more. What about homeless people or prostitutes. Could their pimps take their cards, forcng them to become even more reliant on them. You could have people held to ransom over their cards which are stolen. You may see them being nicked to order.
How long before you need that card to clock on for work - no card, no pay. You'd be f***ed if you forgot it.
They've got enough information as ity is. Maybe if there was better inter-agency co-operation then everything would be better.
Also what if you lost it or it fell into the wrong hands. Imagine someone stole your card, committed a crime and then your card got the blame as it were. Or if the information was put on the wrong card, these mistakes could happen. You could see yourself refused everything from credit to health care on the basis that some twat accidentally put a 5 instead of a 6 on a computer.
I also think it excludes people even more. What about homeless people or prostitutes. Could their pimps take their cards, forcng them to become even more reliant on them. You could have people held to ransom over their cards which are stolen. You may see them being nicked to order.
How long before you need that card to clock on for work - no card, no pay. You'd be f***ed if you forgot it.
They've got enough information as ity is. Maybe if there was better inter-agency co-operation then everything would be better.
Pavilionaire
Well-known member
- Jul 7, 2003
- 31,638
If they are introduced you know that:
1. People, especially illegal immigrants, will fake them.
2. The same over-worked, cumbersome, creaking Home Office system for dealing with these people will be in place and so reducing the numbers of illegal immigrants will not happen.
3. The police will abuse the newfound opportunity and relations with the public, many law-abiding, will deteriorate.
4. The police / Home Office database will be leaked / fall into the wrong hands.
5. £40 a shot per person, plus the cost to the taxpayer of subsidising those that cannot afford them.
6. They will need to be updated every 5 years, so probably £20 per replacement card.
7. Some godawful part of Wales will be charges with the responsibility of administering the system, resulting in call-waiting hell and communication meltdown.
8. DNA information will be next, probably in 5-10 years time.
1. People, especially illegal immigrants, will fake them.
2. The same over-worked, cumbersome, creaking Home Office system for dealing with these people will be in place and so reducing the numbers of illegal immigrants will not happen.
3. The police will abuse the newfound opportunity and relations with the public, many law-abiding, will deteriorate.
4. The police / Home Office database will be leaked / fall into the wrong hands.
5. £40 a shot per person, plus the cost to the taxpayer of subsidising those that cannot afford them.
6. They will need to be updated every 5 years, so probably £20 per replacement card.
7. Some godawful part of Wales will be charges with the responsibility of administering the system, resulting in call-waiting hell and communication meltdown.
8. DNA information will be next, probably in 5-10 years time.
Seagull Stew
Well-known member
ID cards for people claiming benefits are fine. Show your card at the desk to get whetever you're entitled to is fair enough.
But being legally obliged to carry or wear anything other than what is necessary to prevent indecent exposure IS a breach of civil liberties.
But being legally obliged to carry or wear anything other than what is necessary to prevent indecent exposure IS a breach of civil liberties.
Lord Bracknell
On fire
ID cards are pretty much universal in Europe.
They allow free travel between EU states without the need for passports and frontier controls. But they only work if the police have the right to inspect IDs at any time - and take action if the card is not produced. No problem for white people with a local accent, I guess, but I can see substantial trouble for others.
As far as the civil liberties argument is concerned, I reckon many of those have been eroded already. I doubt ID cards will make much difference.
They allow free travel between EU states without the need for passports and frontier controls. But they only work if the police have the right to inspect IDs at any time - and take action if the card is not produced. No problem for white people with a local accent, I guess, but I can see substantial trouble for others.
As far as the civil liberties argument is concerned, I reckon many of those have been eroded already. I doubt ID cards will make much difference.
Lord Bracknell said:
I don't think so Lord B. The problem is that the argments for id cards have not progressed much past "I don't have anything to hide, so I've got no problem with them."
We need to open up the debate so that the public can see the real pro's and cons for id cards.
How often do you get annoyed when the police start videoing you at a football match. An invasion of your privacy no? I imagine most people on this board object. The same people that say they have nothing to hide. Will they be so readily supportive when asked to produce their id on the way to a game?
Brixtaan
New member
...not much difference.but still one more step?!
The biggest civil liberty that has been taken away,is having the freedom not to be a consumer.Unfortunately this is impossible to blame on anyone but is the shackle that limits freedom of movement and speech.
The biggest civil liberty that has been taken away,is having the freedom not to be a consumer.Unfortunately this is impossible to blame on anyone but is the shackle that limits freedom of movement and speech.
Gary Nelson
New member
The most important of issues here is if the ID cards enable you to get into a club in Brighton without having to take 13 pieces of home address and remember what Bethal has for dinner on a tuesday night at number 37, then Im all for it
Lord Bracknell
On fire
In my opinion we need a debate on civil liberties more than a debate about ID cards.Hamilton said:
I have nothing to hide, but that doesn't stop me getting pissed off when I discover that Special Branch have been taking a particular interest in the activities of me and my friends - to the extent of turning up at a pub where a band I used to be involved with were playing. Amusingly, they introduced themselves to the landlord, who told us who they were.
And when I was involved in civil defence planning, I also had a mysterious conversation with someone from the army who said "Your clearance has taken a long time to come through".
Why ffs? Who had Big Brother mistaken me for?
All this was years ago. ID cards won't make any difference. They might even make the murky activities of the state more transparent.